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INTRODUCTION
Banks want to sort borrowers according to whether the borrower is high or lowrisk. In this paper, we ask if a bank's incentive to sort borrowers is an inducement to invest in restructuring know-how. To answer this question, we explore the role of outside collateral and restructuring know-how within a framework of twodimensional asymmetric information. We model banks that can neither observe the borrower's type ex ante nor the project's outcome ex post. The debt contract contains a bankruptcy clause that defines the project's assets as the inside collateral of the contract. This clause enables the creditor to seize the firm's assets in the event of default. But, as the bank is a priori the less efficient manager of the firm, the entrepreneur has an incentive to default strategically and renegotiate his debt 1 . To weaken this incentive of repudiation (Gale/Hellwig (1989) ), the entrepreneur may either be forced to pledge outside collateral or the bank may invest in restructuring know-how upfront. The latter is an investment for protecting the value of the inside collateral. We assume that if the bank has invested it can take over efficiently in the event of default.
Restructuring know-how may be thought of as an intensive, firm-specific, monitoring process that starts immediately after the firm has chosen a restructuring contract. During the process, the bank's loan officer, together with some members of the restructuring department, may collect any relevant information and prepare it for later use. Because collecting private information cannot be done without developing a relationship with the firm and consulting the entrepreneur from time to time, the bank's ability to restructure a firm and to maintain it after taking it over as a going concern is an important feature of relationship lending (Boot (2000) ; Brunner/Krahnen (2000) ). With information collection as crucial part of the investment in restructuring know-how, it seems natural to assume that the borrower can observe the bank's upfront investment.
Our research makes two points. First, we show that self-selection by the low-risk borrower who pledges private assets as collateral may also exist in a framework of costly verification of the state. This contradicts Bester 's (1994) result that unobservability of a project's returns leads to collateralization by the high-risk entrepreneur. In fact, observability of risks is crucial to Bester 's conclusion. Building on Bester 's framework, and assuming that the borrower's type is unknown, we find that outside collateral acts as a sorting device. Thus, the low-risk borrower is more inclined to secure his debt with additional private assets than is the high-risk borrower. Although this result is in accordance with most of the theoretical research, it is somewhat puzzling when we consider the empirical literature. Most studies find just the opposite to be true (see Berger/Udell (1995) , Carey/Post/Sharpe (1998 ), or Elsas/Krahnen (1998 and Table 1 ).
On the basis of our findings we suggest that this puzzle might be due to the fact that theoretical and empirical research concentrate on different stages of the creditor/debtor relationship. At the start of this relationship, the new borrower's risk class is always somewhat unclear. Banks are therefore obliged to allow for selfselection even if it is extremely expensive to secure debt. However, as the creditor learns more about his clients, the urge for self-selection gradually disappears. The outside collateral's potential to force proper repayment then becomes the dominant motivation for securing debt, and the creditor will demand outside collateral from the high-risk borrower in the first place. By relying implicitly on the sortingby-observed-risk paradigm (Berger/Udell (1990) ), empirical research presumably captures only the second, more mature, stage of this relationship 2 . This explanation of the disparity between theory and empiricism is supported by an empirical study by Cressy (1996) . By analyzing the financing of business start-ups, Cressy shows that low-risk entrepreneurs do indeed pledge more outside collateral and pay lower interest rates than do high-risk borrowers.
Our second main point refers to the ongoing struggle by banks to establish effective restructuring departments and permanently enhance their efficiency once these departments are in place. We suggest that the investment in restructuring know-how is not only driven by the increased default risk, but also by the way banks use outside collateral in debt contracts. First, according to our findings, restructuring know-how may economize on the extremely inefficient, but because of self-selection nevertheless inevitable, pledging of outside collateral. Second, if self-selection cannot be achieved using outside collateral, restructuring know-how can function as an alternative sorting mechanism. We want to stress that in most cases of separation a bank only chooses to invest in preserving the value of the inside collateral and in being tough in case of default if it faces a high-risk borrower. Although the low-risk borrower has to pledge outside collateral, he may also obtain debt forgiveness. Interestingly, in some separating equilibria created either by outside collateral only or by restructuring know-how, banks can earn sustainable positive profits even though there is perfect competition (Bester (1995) ) 3 .
In preparation for making these main points we develop a benchmark model in which banks know the borrower's risk type a priori, but cannot observe the project returns directly. Since high-risk borrowers are more likely to default strategically than are low-risk borrowers, their motivation to secure the debt with additional private assets is stronger. For the same reason, when dealing with the highrisk borrower, banks have a greater incentive to invest ex ante in restructuring expertise.
preneur is in charge, this investment yields the high return x h if it is successful and x l otherwise. We do not allow for safe credits, I > x l + W. To simplify the model, we normalize the interest rate to zero. The project's returns are the private information of the entrepreneur. The creditor can only observe the true outcome after transfer of control. Depending on the entrepreneur's type j ∈ [g, b] , the probability that the project succeeds is either p g or p b , where 1 > p g > p b > 0. Each borrower knows his own type.
Banks
Banks are perfectly competitive and face a perfectly elastic supply of funds. The bank cannot distinguish among borrowers. It only knows that a fraction µ of the entrepreneurs are low-risk types g (good borrowers) and that the rest (1 − µ) are high-risk types b (bad borrowers). Moreover, banks are, a priori, the less efficient managers. Therefore, if the entrepreneur declares default and the bank exercises the right to foreclose, it has to bear a transfer-related loss of (1 − α i ) x i , where i ∈ {l,h}. However, the creditor can get around this takeover cost if he chooses to invest S ex ante and build up restructuring know-how. We assume that the creditor's skill in restructuring is effective only if the declared failure is true. In this case it preserves the value of the inside collateral and lowers the takeover cost to zero. Denoting the creditor's decision by k ∈ {0,S } we define
(1) Assumption (1) reflects economies of specialization. If such economies exist the creditor always concentrates on the restructuring of companies that are truly in default. We assume that an unsuccessful project can never yield higher returns than a successful project, even though the bank has invested S, The bank may also demand outside collateral. If the entrepreneur has secured the outstanding debt and default occurs, the bank liquidates the outside collateral at a cost of (1 − β )C. At first we examine the bank's situation if it has not invested S. Suppose the project turns out to be unsuccessful and default is declared. The bank does not know what the state is. It can either take possession of the entrepreneur's assets or renegotiate and forgive a portion of the outstanding debt. Since takeover would depress the asset's value to α l x l , the creditor's dominant strategy is to reduce the repayment obligation to x l , the maximum amount the entrepreneur pretends to have. However, since the face value R is greater than I and, consequently, also greater than x l + C, the prospect of a smaller repayment obligation creates a strong incentive to default in the good state as well.
Suppose now that the creditor has invested S. There is then no takeover-related loss in the bad state. Clearly, debt forgiveness is always inferior. Because it is certain that control of the firm will be transferred to the bank, the entrepreneur's incentive to default strategically vanishes. and the entrepreneur is indifferent between repayment and default,
x h − R = (1 − t j 0 )(x h − C − x l ) + t j 0 (−C ). respectively. We turn now to k = S. In the case of default, if i = l, the lender is indifferent between bankruptcy and renegotiation. In state h, he will strictly prefer a takeover, as α h x h > x l . Thus, given restructuring skills, the optimal strategy is takeover with certainty, that is t jS = 1. Takeover with certainty implies truth telling, d jS = 0. With truth telling, t jS = 1 is weakly dominating. Sequential rationality thus leads to consistent beliefs and the equilibrium strategies are d jS = 0 and t jS = 1. If the project succeeds, the entrepreneur pays back R. If the project fails, the lender seizes the assets and the collateral.
BASIC STRUCTURE AND DEFINITION OF EQUILIBRIUM
We denote a credit contract as (R,C ). (R jk , C jk ), k ∈ {0,S } is the contract signed by type j exclusively. (R k , C k ) is the pooling contract adopted by both types. If k = S, we refer to the contracts as restructuring contracts. We do not allow for random strategies in granting a credit in t = 0. To exclude signaling the entrepreneur's type by means of credit size, we assume that the project's initial outlay is identical for each investor 5 . The following timing of moves illustrates the basic structure of the model:
2. entrepreneurs choose the type of contract, receive the credit and invest I, and depending on the chosen contract, lenders invest the (observable) S or nothing, 3. the project's return is realized, 4. if the project is successful (i = h), entrepreneurs decide whether to pay back or default, 5. lenders may either renegotiate or take over.
Suppose the separating contracts (R gk ,C gk ) and (R bk ,C bk ) have been adopted. Given the equilibrium probability of false default d jk , the bank's expected profit is
This is the expected return in the non default state, plus the expected return in the case of default, minus the funding costs, and minus the costs of acquiring restructuring know-how. Zero profit for the bank implies
Next, we examine pooling. We denote the equilibrium probability of default in the case of pooling as d jk . The bank's expected profit in a pooling equilibrium is
Since the bank's payoffs are identical for both types (see Figure 1) 
Zero profit for the bank yields the face value (5) where p ≡ µp g + (1 − µ)p b . The calculation of the entrepreneur's profit function gives
We consider only feasible projects, that is, G b 0 ≥ 0, ∏ j ≥ 0 6 . By inserting (4) into (6) and differentiating the resulting expression for C, after rearranging we arrive at Using (5) in the same way, we obtain (7) β jk and β jk indicate thresholds that refer to the ex post efficiency of securing debt. If β is above the threshold, collateral's benefit which is the prevention of strategic default, is higher than its liquidation cost. Thus, securing debt is ex post efficient: C = W. With separated types we have β b 0 < β g 0 . The threshold for pledging outside collateral is lower for the bad borrower than for the good one. This is because type b is more inclined to deceive the bank. Since outside collateral reduces the incentive to pretend false returns, the borrower who cheats with higher probability
should pledge outside collateral in the first place. If the bank has acquired restructuring expertise, d jS = d S = 0 imply β jS = β jS = 1. This indicates that collateral is not beneficial in terms of preventing strategic default. The reason is that the restructuring know-how completely rules out the entrepreneur's motive to deceive the bank. Since the "job" is already done, collateralization is left with expected cost of (1 − β )W but no benefits, so to refrain from it is certainly efficient.
It is easily checked that β g 0 < β g 0 and β b 0 > β b 0 . For simplicity, we assume that the fraction of good borrowers is in a medium range, so that β g 0 < β b 0 and β b 0 > β g 0 . Obviously, the entrepreneur's ex post efficient strategy for collateral will change if he is pooled. Type g's incentive to pledge outside collateral is certainly strengthened. The reason for this is that the bank treats every single borrower as being of average quality. However, type g has a higher success probability than does the average debtor. Thus, if he is pooled, his motivation to default strategically and renegotiate his debt grows instantly. Refusal of payment lowers efficiency and profit, and that makes the restriction of the cheating motive via outside collateral especially beneficial. In contrast, the high-risk borrower faces a different situation. Since his success probability is overestimated in the pool, his motivation to cheat is weakened. Because the pool itself imposes more discipline on the high-risk borrower, the profitability of the disciplinary instrument outside collateral is lowered.
How does ex post efficiency of collateralization affect the equilibrium contracts if the bank has already chosen to offer a pooling variant? Since securing debt increases the profits, the entrepreneur who faces a higher β than his threshold β j 0 will strictly prefer a fully collateralized variant over any other pooling contract with C < W. This strict preference is the ultimate reason for the existence of Nash equilibria even in case of pooling. We analyze this in more detail in Section 3, but at this stage we already want to stress that ex post efficiency is crucial to our analysis of equilibria in the two-dimensional information asymmetry scenario.
With β < β jk (β < β jk ), collateralization is ex post inefficient. However, if the bank cannot observe the borrower's type, then outside collateral serves two different purposes, the identification of types and the deterrence of strategic default. Thus, inefficiency in preventing strategic default does not imply that the entrepreneur rejects debt securization. On the contrary, as we will show in the following analysis of a perfectly competitive credit market. We define the equilibrium in this market as follows: The intuition is as follows: Since the bad borrower faces a higher repayment obligation than does the good borrower, the probability that the bank takes over is higher for type b than for type g. Consequently, if the high-risk borrower applies for credit, preparation to avoid the takeover-related losses is especially useful.
TWO-DIMENSIONAL INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
We now examine the more realistic scenario, in which the lender can neither observe the borrower's quality nor the project's return. Since parties cannot commit to the equilibrium strategies, we use the modified revelation principle of Bester/Strausz (2001) , which applies to cases of limited commitment. According to this principle we can restrict our attention to credit policies that are incentive-compatible. That is, sorting of borrowers occurs if, and only if,
hold, where (R bk ,C bk ) and (R gk ,C gk ) satisfy (3) for j = b and j = g respectively. When we address the problem of what kind of contracts are actually obtained in a competitive equilibrium, we concentrate first on outside collateral only. Thus, in the next section, we assume prohibitively high costs for restructuring expertise (k = 0), and focus exclusively on Nash equilibria.
COMPETITIVE EQUILBRIUM WITH OUTSIDE COLLATERAL
Under ex post asymmetric information (unobservability of project returns), a borrower never pledges outside collateral in equilibrium if β < β b 0 , because the impact of outside collateral on the probability of inefficient takeover is too small to cover the huge debtor's loss generated by the great disparity between his and the lender's valuation of collateral. However, under two-dimensional information asymmetry, the uncollateralized contracts (R g 0 ,0) and (R b 0 ,0) cannot represent the bank's optimal credit policy, because the menu is never incentive-compatible. The bad borrower instantly covets any contract (R g 0 ,0) that meets the bank's zeroprofit condition. In addition, the bank cannot escape from the incentive-compatibility problem by offering a safe credit, since the full insurance level (10) is not feasible, W < W fI . However, outside collateral may allow for incentive compatibility if its value is sufficiently low. To see this, we derive the equilibrium isoprofit function of type b. Let us denote by
Substituting Π j on the left-hand side of (6) (11) and R g 0 (C ) from (4) we obtain C * g 0 and R * g 0 . To describe the range for a separating equilibrium, we use C = W in (11), equalize it with R g 0 (W ) from (4), and solve for β. Let us define the result as β ′. Assumption W < W fI ensures β ′ < β b 0 .
Proposition 2 If β ≤ β ′, then in an equilibrium under two-dimensional asymmetric information, the bank's optimal credit policy is given by the separating contracts
(R * g 0 ,C * g 0 ≤ W ) and (R * b 0 ,
0). Only the good borrowers secure their debt. The banks just break even.
Our result supports the current literature on the sorting of borrowers. With β ≤ β ′ < β b 0 < β g 0 , the collateral's liquidation costs are so high that entrepreneurs will never offer collateral when dealing only with strategic default. Therefore, the marginal rates of substitution between outside collateral and repayment have the same structure as in Bester (1985) or Besanko/Thakor (1987) . In addition, for β ≤ β ′ collateralization is so expensive that even small amounts of collateral deter the bad borrower from coveting the good borrower's contract, and the wealth constraint W is not binding. Both features imply that the nature of the separating equilibrium must
resemble the one found in Bester (1985) and Besanko/Thakor (1987) 7 . In the light of this outcome, clearly, one of the main messages in Bester (1994) , that bad borrowers secure their debt in the first place, is not viable if banks cannot observe the borrower's type. Given a priori private information within a framework of costly verification of state and debt renegotiation, pledging of outside collateral is more attractive for the good borrower than it is for the bad borrower.
Since banks make zero profits, we call the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 an ordinary separating equilibrium. Surprisingly there is, for a certain range of β, a separating equilibrium that yields sustainable positive profits to the bank. To see this, let R 0 be the face value resulting from (5) for C = W. Furthermore, let us denote by R + g 0 the face value derived from (11) No ordinary separating equilibrium is feasible in this medium range of collateral's valuation, because the borrowers' wealth constraint is always binding. Thus, one would expect the bank to offer a uniform contract, but such a contract cannot be an equilibrium either. This is because both contracting parties are better off with a separating menu such that, on the one hand, the bad borrower is indifferent between the separating contracts (R * b 0 ,0), and (R + g 0 ,W ) and, on the other hand, (R + g 0 ,W ) guarantees positive profits to the bank. Since both high-and low-risk borrowers will prefer any rival contract that reduces the bank's profits, newcomers, who might offer such a rival contract would end up with a loss-making pooling contract 8 .
In the following sections we refer to the menu described in Proposition 3 as a non ordinary separating equilibrium. Note that market entry may occur in such an equilibrium, but only with perfect copies of the defined equilibrium contracts. Clearly, in a non ordinary separating equilibrium, applicants are never denied credit and rationing can never occur. However, self selection via outside collateral does not always operate. Sorting risks fails if the collateral's value is sufficiently high. In a separating equilibrium, the good borrower uses outside collateral to distance himself from the high-risk type. But, for such an equilibrium to emerge, coveting the contract of the good borrower must be sufficiently "expensive" for the bad 
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7 There is no Nash equilibrium if the fraction of low-risk types in the population is too high. If the menu [(R * g 0 ,C * g 0 ),(R * b ,0)] of Proposition 2 fails to be a Nash equilibrium, it is a reactive equilibrium (see Riley (1979) ). 8 The non ordinary separating equilibrium is even a Nash equilibrium if W is not too small. For small W, it is at least a reactive equilibrium.
borrower. Highly valued private assets lower the bank's incentive to carry out an inefficient takeover on a large enough scale to make debt securization efficient, or at least almost efficient. Since the bad borrower's imitation costs are (almost) zero,
Thus, the pooling contract is the only feasible contract here. There is evidence that banks sometimes tend to collateralize their loans to the highest possible degree without checking the borrower's risk class. In the light of Proposition 4, such a behavior might be due to the fact that private assets are sufficiently valuable and an alternative sorting mechanism is not available. However, in any pooling equilibrium the good borrower subsidizes the bad one. This effect certainly provides low-risk entrepreneurs with the highest motivation to escape from such an equilibrium.
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRUM WITH RESTRUCTURING KNOW-HOW AND OUTSIDE COLLATERAL
Restructuring know-how can prevent the bank from having to bear the costs if it chooses to get tough and take over after default. Thus, restructuring skills eliminate completely strategic default and securing debt becomes more expensive from the entrepreneur's point of view. The bank's marginal rate of substitution between outside collateral C and the face value R is in general, and not only for a specific range of β higher than the entrepreneur's rate. As we will see this expanding of the lender/borrower disparity in substitution rates affects the collateral's sorting potential. To develop our argument, we first derive from (6) and (4), k = S, the isoprofit line of entrepreneur b as a monotonic function of S,
Solving (12) for S and inserting the result in R gS (C) from (4) gives, after rearranging, (13) For any given S, the function R (β,C ) reflects the good borrower's restructuring contract that makes (8) with k = S binding and yields zero profits to the bank. That is, for any S, the bad borrower is indifferent between the contracts (R (β,C ),C ) and (R bS (0),0). Now let us denote by R * bS the face value R (S,0) | Π b from (12). Furthermore, let R * gS and C * gS be the values that satisfy (13).
Lemma 1 Suppose both risk types adopt a restructuring contract (k = S) and the wealth constraint is not binding. Then, for any S > 0, a separating menu exists which yields zero profits to the bank. Only the low-risk entrepreneur pledges collateral.
[(R bS
D. Schäfer
Since the upfront investment ensures that collateralization is inefficient not only for low values of β, but also in the whole range β ∈ (0, 1), restructuring know-how strengthens the collateral's potential to sort borrowers. If k = S for both types and private wealth does not impose a constraint on contracts, it must hold, in the entire range of β, that a pooling contract can never be an equilibrium (Besanko/Thakor (1987) ) 9 . Thus, restructuring contracts adopted by the two types must be distinct. Nevertheless it is still an open question whether, in a credit market equilibrium, both types actually select restructuring contracts. To answer this question, we first identify the cost interval where restructuring know-how has no impact on the equilibrium contracts. Then we analyze the case in which outside collateral sorts borrowers anyway (β < β″ ). Finally we concentrate on the range (β ≥ β″ ) and derive the impact of restructuring know-how on the pooling equilibria.
Proposition 5 Given S > Ŝ b , restructuring contracts are not adopted in equilibrium. The bank's optimal credit policy consists of the menus given in Proposition 2 to 4.
Any restructuring contract that is rejected by the bad borrower in the case of a one-dimensional information asymmetry (S > Ŝ b ) must be also inferior in a twodimensional information asymmetry scenario. Thus, there is no distortion-at-thebottom. Moreover, a contract that is too costly for the high-risk borrower can never be attractive for the low-risk borrower. This fact reflects Ŝ g < Ŝ b and that the pledging of outside collateral reduces the benefits of restructuring know-how even for the low-risk borrower. With this in mind, we are now able to consider the impact of restructuring know-how on equilibria where the upfront investment may take place.
REDUCTION OF SEPARATION COSTS VIA RESTRUCTURING KNOW-HOW
For a given private wealth W, borrowers' sorting with outside collateral requires β < β″ < β b 0 . As Proposition 6 states, restructuring know-how affects both sorting equilibria. To prove that, we use Lemma 2. We denote the repayment obligation that satisfies (12) and (4) for j = g and k = 0 as R * g 0 . The corresponding outside collateral is Ĉ * g 0 . The contract that satisfies (13) and (4) for j = g and k = 0 is denoted by (R g ,C˜g). 
Lemma 2

If
S = S gW (β ) ≡ W ( p g (1 − d g )(1 − p b )) + (I − x l )( p b − (1 − d g ) p g ) p g (1 − d g ) −β Wp b (1 − p g (1 − d g )) p g (1 − d g ) ≤Ŝ b ∀ β ≥ β ′
If the bad borrower is indifferent between three types of contracts:
3. There is a critical value With S = S g , the entrepreneurs' indifference curves Π b and Π g and the bank's zero-profit functions R g 0 and R gS meet at C˜g. This result implies that entrepreneur g is indifferent between the two separating contracts (R * g 0 ,Ĉ * g 0 ) and (R * gS ,C * gS ). If S < S g , the zero-profit function R gS (C ) is below R g 0 (C ) for all C < C g . This finding indicates that any restructuring contract (R * gS ,C * gS ) that leaves the bad borrower indifferent between (R * gS ,C * gS ) and (R * bS ,0) is superior to a separating non restructuring contract (R * g 0 ,Ĉ * g 0 ).
The intuition for Proposition 6 is that restructuring know-how pays the bad borrower in the first place and enhances his profit even when restructuring costs are high. A restructuring contract saves the high-risk borrower from having to bear transfer-related losses that would be high because bad borrowers face a high repayment obligation, and, consequently, a high probability of control transfer to the bank in the event of default. The contracted repayment of the low-risk borrower is smaller in equilibrium. Also, this borrower pledges collateral. The problem of strategic default and inefficient takeover is therefore less severe and restructuring expertise is less profitable within this risk class. Thus, good borrowers do not sign a restructuring contract in a medium range of S. Nevertheless, they benefit from the bank's upfront investment that is dedicated to type b. First, in the range of β ∈ (β ′,β ″) and S ∈(S g W ,Ŝ b ) the bank earns positive profits. However, any reduction of the costs of restructuring know-how enables a market entrant to offer a rival contract with maximum collateral but lower face value. Since the probability of inefficient takeover by the bank increases with R the lower face value in the good borrower's contract reduces the cost of separation and enhances his surplus.
Second, in the ranges β ≤ β ′ or β ∈ (β ′,β ″) and S < S g W , type b's restructuring contract reduces the amount of outside collateral needed for separation. Since pledg- ing of collateral is inefficient for all β ≤ β ″, this reduction must increase the lowrisk borrower's equilibrium profit and simultaneously lower the cost of separation. Because the upfront investment instantly increases the marginal cost of sorting, type g gains from choosing the restructuring contract only if S is at the low level S ≤ S g . In an equilibrium in which banks are competing for the loan contracts, the entrepreneurs' profit represents the whole surplus in the economy. Thus, if the upfront investment in restructuring know-how does occur it certainly enhances the overall wealth.
RESTORING A SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM VIA RESTRUCTURING KNOW-HOW
Bad borrowers mimic good borrowers and pledge maximum outside collateral if outside collateral is sufficiently valuable (β ≥ β ″). Thus, without investment in restructuring know-how, the bank's only feasible credit policy consists of a fully 
If the bad borrower is indifferent between a restructuring contract without collateral and a uniform, fully collateralized restructuring contract,
3. There is a critical value such that S P (β P ) = S bW (β P ) > 0 and If β = β P , both borrowers are indifferent between the two variants of a fully collateralized pooling contract, Π j (R 0 ,W ) = Π j (R S ,W ), and therefore
Again, Figure 2 illustrates the defined critical cost functions. As the next Proposition states, the up front investment that protects the value of the inside collateral is an alternative sorting device.
Proposition 7
In the interval β ∈ (β ″,1) restructuring know-how restores sorting for all S < min [S b W ,S P ].
The banks respond to uniform, but expensive, pledging of outside collateral by building up restructuring know-how. Note that the destruction of the pooling
with β P ∈(β,1)
equilibria occurs without any additional measures from the entrepreneur's side, such as bringing in a cosigner (Besanko/Thakor (1987) ). As long as the costs of restructuring know-how are only slightly below S b W , banks earn sustainable positive profits from financing the low-risk borrower even though there is perfect competition. The intuition for this observation is that the restructuring contract withdraws the bad borrower from the fully collateralized pooling contract even though the amount S b W needed to preserve the value of the inside collateral is still fairly high. With only the good borrowers remaining, the former pooling contract earns the bank positive profits. Given that there is perfect competition, we would expect such positive profits to be unsustainable. However, for a profit-eroding market entry to occur, the newcomer who offers the rival contract should be able to expect a surplus. But a surplus is not achievable. Each contract with lower outside collateral and/or lower repayment than in the former pooling contract would be preferred by both type g and type b. So, to avoid losses with certainty, a newcomer can only offer a pooling contract and must make sure that both types accept that contract. However, this kind of offer is impossible, given that the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 4 is a Nash equilibrium. Then type g is worse off with any alternative pooling contract (R 0 (C ),C < W ) than with the original contract (R 0 ,W ). Figure 4 , which applies to the interval β ″ < β < β, illustrates this. Given that S = S b W , type g prefers the contract (R 0 ,W ) to any less collateralized pooling contract.
However, there is a source for driving positive bank profits down to zero. If S goes down, banks have to reduce type b's repayment due to perfect competition. Thus, with more effective banks, type b's incentive compatibility constraint is no longer binding. If banks nevertheless stick to type g's old contract, opportunities to enter the market profitably would instantly arise. Newcomers might offer an alternative contract with a slightly reduced repayment. All good borrowers would choose the new contract, thereby forcing the old contract out of the market. The competition-induced reduction of the repayment only stops when b's incentive compatibility constraint is again binding. Thus, if effectiveness in establishing restructuring know-how grows -that is, S decreases -profits shrink. But for profits to erode completely, the costs must be sufficiently small. Figure 4 shows that, only if S is down to S g W does the incentive-compatible menu [(R * bS ,0), (R + g 0 ,W )] meet the zero-profit condition of both types.
Given that the bank has a high valuation of the entrepreneur's private wealth (β > β), in equilibrium both types choose only restructuring contracts. They will do so because for all possible values of C, type g's repayment obligation is lower with a restructuring contract than it is with a non restructuring contract. With S < S b W and β > β, separation will only take place as long as the low-risk borrower finds it more attractive to separate and share profits with the bank than he does to pool with the high-risk borrower (and subsidize that type) in a contract in which both choose the investment in restructuring know-how. If costs are not low enough, S P < S < S b W , the good borrower will prefer the pooling contract with restructuring know-how and maximum collateralization and the bad borrower will follow suit.
Such an equilibrium might seem surprising, since we have argued above that restructuring know-how makes collateralization ex post inefficient in general, and not only in a specific range of β. However, this general inefficiency is only true in the case of separation. With pooling, the low-risk borrower is more attracted to securing debt even if there is restructuring know-how. The reason behind this observation is the bank/borrower disparity in the expectation that the collateral is taken. The bank calculates with a higher probability than the low-risk entrepreneur does. Thus, there is a threshold of β such that, for any β higher than this threshold, the low-risk entrepreneur welcomes the reduction of R following collateralization. In addition, the surplus of separation does not go exclusively to entrepreneur g, but must be shared with the bank. Both of these points imply that the pooling contract with restructuring know-how and maximum outside collateral for high values of β may be more attractive than the profit-sharing separating contract with that investment. That is, S P < S < S b W . Only if S < S P < S b W does type g select the profit-sharing separating contract with restructuring expertise 12 . 
CONCLUSION
This paper explains the economic role of outside collateral and restructuring knowhow under strategic default and private information. The result that the risk of strategic default leads to pledging of outside collateral primarily by the high-risk borrowers does not appear to be robust. With private information added, our findings confirm a predominant result in the literature dealing with debt securization. The low-risk entrepreneur selects himself by using outside collateral. Therefore low-risk borrowers are more likely to pledge outside collateral than are high-risk borrowers.
Even though the static nature of our model does not allow us to capture the effects of a long-term bank-borrower relationship on informational disadvantage, nevertheless we risk concluding that the ongoing debate in the empirical literature on whether the high-or the low-risk borrower must pledge more outside collateral could be a matter of the maturity of the relationships investigated. Therefore, we believe that the explicit modeling of how the degree of informational asymmetry changes during repeated project financing, and how this learning on the bank's side affects the purpose and the terms of the credit contracts, is a promising field for future research.
We also suggest that uncollateralized credit contracts with implicit restructuring for high-risk borrowers could become major features in the market for new loans. Both features are the bank's best response to the costs of informational disadvantage and the danger of repudiation, regardless of whether outside collateral is valuable or not. If the liquidation values of the entrepreneur's private assets are low, restructuring know-how eases the cost of separation. If liquidation values are high restructuring know-how may enable the bank to identify risk types.
APPENDIX
Proposition 1
Since S j (β ) solves Π j (R j 0 ,C = λW ) = Π j (R jS ,C = 0) and ∂Π j (R jS ,C = 0)/∂S < 0, it is true that Π j (R j 0 (C ), C = λW ) < Π j (R jS (0),0) ⇔ S < S j . If β ≤ β j 0 and λ = 0, the threshold S j is constant and at its maximum Ŝ j = (I − 
Proposition 2
The proof is standard in the literature (see for example Bester (1985) and Besanko/Thakor (1987) ). A separating equilibrium (if it exists) arises in which the good borrower secures his debt and (8) 
